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h i g h l i g h t s
• When future does not count, growth occurs if consumption and leisure are not complements.
• In this case, the production side only affects the growth rate.
• If future counts, under Cobb–Douglas preferences, there is constant growth.
• Meritocracy is always good for growth but not necessarily so for optimality.
a b s t r a c t
In this paper we present a dynamic model of cooperative production with human capital accumulation. We assume CES preferences on consumption 
and leisure in each period. When agents do not care about future generations, sustained growth occurs iff the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is larger or equal than one. Meritocracy always has a positive effect on output, but when the elasticity of substitution is 
less than one, is only a level effect. When agents care about future generations, under Cobb–Douglas preferences in each period and some extra 
conditions, there is constant growth at a rate that is larger than the one when future generations do not count. For any discount rate between 
generations, there is a unique level of meritocracy for which efficiency is achieved.
1. Introduction
The theory of cooperative production studies an economy in
which workers offer their labor to a production center (the coop).
The forerunners of this theory wereWard (1958) who imagined an
ideal (‘‘Illyrian’’) world, Vanek (1970) who focussed on connecting
the theory with the cooperative movement and Sen (1966), who
modeled the coop as a sharing rule to distribute the output.1 Later
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1 Illyrian has been often used in the literature to represent an ideal world:
‘‘Shakespeare’s Illyria is a fantasy land of make-believe and illusion’’ (Shakespeare,
1993, p. 169) or even a scientific Utopia (Beckett, 2003).
on, Moulin (1987) and Roemer and Silvestre (1993) provided foun-
dations for different sharing rules. In this paper, we follow Sen’s
approach. The (impossible) goal of the theory of cooperative pro-
duction is to mimic the theory of markets with profit maximizing
firms by offering a detailed study of all the possible outcomes. In
this (grand) research picture the theory of cooperative production
lacks in dynamic models that illustrate the engines and the conse-
quences of growth. Our paper is addressed to explore these ques-
tions.
Our model is very simple. Individuals are identical in all re-
spects: preferences, labor endowments, and the human capital
(capital in the sequel) inherited in the first period from their an-
cestors.2 They care about consumption and leisure. Each individ-
ual produces her own capital using the inherited capital and labor.
Output is produced by capital and it is distributed according to a
sharing rule. Finally, individuals consume and die, leaving to their
successors the human/social capital they have accumulated.
2 Another interpretation of capital is that refers to social capital, see Dasgupta
(2002).
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The coop is composed of a large number of individuals, capital is
the product of the inherited capital and labor, the utility function is
CES, the production functionhas constant elasticity and the sharing
rule is a weighted average of the proportional and the egalitarian
sharing rules. There are 6 parameters in our model:
1. Initial conditions: capital in the initial period.
2. Productivity: the returns to scale in the production of consump-
tion.
3. Degree of meritocracy: the weight of the proportional sharing
rule in the sharing rule.
4. Taste for consumption: the weight of consumption versus
leisure.
5. Substitutability between consumption and leisure: the elastic-
ity of substitution.
6. Labor endowment.
Our main task will be to identify the role of these variables in
the dynamic equilibrium of our model.
We focus on the case inwhich, along the equilibrium path, indi-
viduals make a positive effort. This is always the case if the elastic-
ity of substitution is less or equal to one. If the elasticity is greater
than one this requires a certain bound on how increasing are the
returns to scale.
We start our analysis by considering the limit case in
which individuals do not care about future generations. Under
Cobb–Douglas preferences (i.e. when the elasticity of substitution
equals to one) we show that capital grows at a constant rate.
This rate depends positively on the taste of consumption and the
degree of meritocracy because both encourage effort which in turn
produces more capital.
For any other value of the elasticity of substitution, there is a
steady state value of capital. When the elasticity of substitution is
smaller than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are complements),
the steady state is stable, i.e. growth eventually disappears. This
is explained by the fact that consumption is a poor substitute
of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order to take full
advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which dampens
growth. The value of capital at steady state depends positively on
the degree of meritocracy and the taste of consumption.
If the elasticity of substitution is larger than one (i.e. consump-
tion and leisure are substitutes), capital at the steady state de-
pends negatively on meritocracy and the taste of consumption.
This may sound paradoxical, but it is explained by the fact that the
steady state is now unstable. Thus, given the initial stock of capital,
more meritocracy/taste for consumption may boost the economy
from negative to positive growth. In this case, when human cap-
ital grows, leisure is advantageously replaced by consumption, so
unbounded growth is now possible.
We then consider a more general setup in which individuals
care about future generations and they maximize a discounted
sum of utilities.3 Due to the technical difficulties we focus in the
case in which preferences are Cobb–Douglas. We show that when
future generations do not count much, there is a solution to the
intertemporal maximization problem in which the growth rate
is constant. Such a rate does not exist for certain values of the
parameters, but, when it does, it is larger than the corresponding
rate in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact that when
future counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital which
in turn stimulates growth. As before, meritocracy encourageswork
which produces human capital, which makes the economy grow.
Finally, we study efficiency. Too much meritocracy encourages
too much work because effort not only increases the individual’s
3 Thus the approachdeveloped above is a special case inwhich the discount factor
is zero.
capital but increases her share. On the other hand, too little meri-
tocracy encourages free riding. This suggests that there is an op-
timal degree of meritocracy and Sen (1966) proved that this is
indeed the case: the optimal degree of meritocracy is achieved
when the weight of the proportional sharing rule equals the elas-
ticity of output with respect to capital. We prove that Sen’s result,
which corresponds to a static economy without capital accumula-
tion, holds in our framework.
The role of human capital in models of growth with profit
maximizing firms has been stressed from different angles. Uzawa
(1965) presented the first model, to the best of our knowledge, in
which human capital played a central role in growth. But it is fair
to say that this topic caught fire only after the influential paper
by Lucas (1988). Themodern literature is enormous, see Acemoglu
(2008), Chapter 10 for a survey. From the empirical point of view,
the interest in human capital stems from the highly influential
paper by Barro (1991) which showed that growth is correlated
with the initial value of human capital. See Lucas (2015) for a new
model of the role of human capital in growth. These models share
with our’s the assumption that human capital can be accumulated
without bound and without diminishing returns in the production
of capital. But as far as we can tell, there is no correlate in this
literature to our results linking preferences and growth because in
all the above models, leisure does not play any role. But constant
growth due to human capital is possible as in our model, see Lucas
(1988, pp. 21–25). In the latter, socially optimal and equilibrium
paths diverge, as they do in ourmodel. But there is no ‘‘exogenous’’
variable (themeritocratic parameter in ourmodel) that can be used
to minimize welfare losses.
2. The model and preliminary results
Time is countable infinite. There are n families (dynasties) with
a member alive in each period. An individual alive in period t
from the family i receives from her predecessor a capital of H t−1i ,
the capital accumulated by the previous generation. We assume
that in the first period, all individuals inherit the same amount
of capital, that is, H0i = H0j for all i, j. All individuals have the
same endowment of labor time in every period,ω. We assume that
ω > 1. At time t , each individual produces her own capital from the
inherited capital, H t−1i , and her labor, l
t
i ∈ [0, ω], in the following
way
H ti = H t−1i lti . (2.1)
Let H t = nj=1 H tj be the aggregate capital at period t . Note that
given (2.1), ω > 1 is essential here to allow for capital growth.
The assumption that human capital is produced by inputs that
enter in a multiplicative form has been used in many models of
endogenous growth since the pioneering work of Uzawa (1965),
see e.g. Lucas (1988, p. 18). This multiplicative form has the strong
implication that if one of its terms is zero, it is impossible to
producehuman capital. A form likeH ti = (H t−1i +a)(lti+b), a, b > 0
would be preferable. In this case capital does not fully depreciate
even when the effort is zero. Unfortunately, this formulae does not
yield a tractable model. Wemay think of (2.1) as an approximation
of this more realistic production function when a and b are small.
The consumption good is produced by means of capital rep-
resented by the production function (H t)γ . We have decreas-
ing/constant/increasing returns to scale as long as γ is less, equal
or larger than one.
The consumption of each individual, cti , is determined by a
sharing rule which is written as follows
cti = (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t
i
H t

, ρ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.2)
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When ρ = 1 the sharing rule allocates consumption proportional
to relative capital and when ρ = 0 the sharing rule allocates
consumption in a totally egalitarian manner. The parameter ρ is
the weight attached to the relative contribution of a particular
individual to the aggregate capital and we refer to it as the degree
of meritocracy. Kang (1988) showed that (2.2) for n > 2, is
the unique differentiable sharing rule which is symmetric and
homogeneous of degree zero (i.e. independent of the units inwhich
capital is measured). Moulin (1987) axiomatized this sharing rule
by means of two properties: additivity (if two individuals merge
without changing their efforts the merged individual receives the
sum of the shares of the two individuals) and No-Advantageous
Reallocation (individuals cannot increase the sum of their shares
by reallocating money inside any coalition). Both properties have
a strong strategic flavor.
An individual alive in period t from the family i derives utility
from consumption, cti , and leisure, ω − lti , represented by a CES
utility function
Ui(cti , ω − lti ) =

β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 s
s−1
,
β > 0, s ∈ (0,∞). (2.3)
where s is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
labor. When s → 1, the utility function is Cobb–Douglas. When
s → ∞ utility is linear in consumption and leisure. When s → 0,
the utility function tends to be Leontieff. We refer to β as the taste
for consumption.
The life of an individual, say i at time t , is simple. She inherits
H t−1i capital and she chooses consumption and leisure in order to
maximize her utility function subject to (2.1) and (2.2). Throughout
the paper, we will assume that when an individual maximizes her
utility she takes as given total capital, H t . This can be justified
when there is a very large number of individuals in the society.
In this case, when an individual decides about her investment
she disregards these terms. Under this assumption and (2.1), the
restriction (2.2) defines the consumption as a linear function of
labor. Thus, themaximization problem of individual i is simple and
becomes
Max(cti ,lti )Ui(c
t
i , ω − lti )
s.t.cti = (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t−1
i l
t
i
H t

lti ∈ [0, ωti ]
. (2.4)
We now define our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1. A short run equilibrium in period t is a list
{(c˜ti , l˜ti )}ni=1, such that for any individual i, (c˜ti , l˜ti ) is a solution to
the maximization problem (2.4) taking H˜ t as given and H˜ t =n
j=1 H
t−1
j l˜
t
j .
We close this section showing that at each period t the short run
equilibrium exists and is symmetric, and under certain conditions
on the parameters of the model, the equilibrium is interior.
We offer the formal proofs of these preliminary results in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1. At every t, a short run equilibrium exists, is unique
and symmetric.
The utility as a function of lti given that c
t
i = (H t)γ
1−ρ
n + ρ
Ht−1i lti
Ht

is continuous and the domain is a compact
set (lti ∈ [0, ω]). Thus, existence of a short run equilibrium is
guaranteed. At period 1, all individuals inherit the same capital,
H0i , and all have the same endowment of labor time. Since they
take H1 as given, all of them face the same maximization problem
which has a unique solution and, therefore, they choose the same
amount of labor time. Consequently, the inherited capital in period
2 is also the same for all individuals, and so on. In each period, all
individuals inherit the same capital.
Proposition 2. If γ ( s−1s ) < 1 and ρ > 0, the short run equilibrium
is interior, i.e. l˜ti ∈ (0, ω) for all i.
This condition holds under constant returns to scale (γ = 1),
or if the utility function is Cobb–Douglas, or if s < 1. But if
s > 1, returns to scale must be sufficiently decreasing. Note that if
ρ = 0 individuals expect their income to come entirely from the
aggregate capital which, by assumption, does not change with the
efforts of a single player. Thus they make zero effort.
3. Equilibrium paths
Along this sectionwe assume that γ ( s−1s ) < 1 andρ > 0which
guarantees that the equilibrium is interior.
In order to analyze the equilibrium it is useful to consider the
Lagrange function associated to (2.4),
L = Ui(cti , ω − lti )− λti

cti − (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t−1
i l
t
i
H t

where λti is the Lagrange multiplier. Since we assume that the
parameters of the model are such that the equilibrium is interior,
the first order conditions give us the maximum.
∂Ui(cti , ω − lti )
∂cti
= λti .
∂Ui(cti , ω − lti )
∂ lti
= −λtiρ
(H t)γH t−1i
H t
.
Denoting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure at the maximum asMi(cti , ω − lti )we have that
Mi(cti , ω − lti ) =
H t
ρH t−1i (H t)γ
. (3.1)
For a CES utility function, we have that
Mi(cti , ω − lti ) = β

ω − lti
cti
 1
s
. (3.2)
Combining (3.1) and (3.2),
lti = ω −

(H t)1−γ
βρH t−1i
s
cti . (3.3)
Since all individuals are identical, in an interior symmetric equilib-
rium, H t−1i = H t−1j ; H ti = H tj ; H t−1 = nH t−1i ; H t = nH ti . Thus,
lti = H ti /H t−1i = H t/H t−1, and cti = (H t)γ /n. From (3.3),
H t
H t−1
= ω − ns−1

1
βρH t−1
s
(H t)s(1−γ )+γ . (3.4)
We will refer to (3.4) as the transition function, that defines an
equilibrium path of the human capital.
We start analyzing the case of a linear transition function.
3
3.1. Equilibrium paths with a linear transition function
The transition function is linear iff the utility function is
Cobb–Douglas. In this case, the transition (3.4) can be written as:
H t = ωβρ
1+ βρH
t−1.
The growth rate is given by
g t = H
t − H t−1
H t−1
= ωβρ
1+ βρ − 1. (3.5)
The growth rate is constant, and it is positive iff βρ(ω − 1)
> 1. It increases with labor endowments (so countries rich in
endowments tend to grow faster than countries poor in endow-
ments); in the taste of consumption (so consumerism is good for
growth because incentivizes hard work) and the degree of meri-
tocracy (meritocracy encourages hard work). Returns to scale (γ )
do not play any role. As noted before, full egalitarianism (ρ = 0)
destroys the whole economy in a single period!. Since H t/H t−1 =
lti , g
t = lti − 1 and from (3.5) we see that each individual makes
an effort proportional (βρ/(1 + βρ)) to her endowment of labor
time. This proportion increases with the taste of consumption and
the degree of meritocracy.
3.2. Equilibrium paths with a nonlinear transition function
When s ≠ 1, the transition function has a unique fixed point, Hˆ ,
different from zero given by
Hˆ =
 ω − 1
ns−1

1
βρ
s

1
γ (1−s)
. (3.6)
Note that the assumption that ω > 1 implies that the fixed point
is positive.
The following propositions states the properties of the transi-
tion function around Hˆ . The formal proofs can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 3. The unique fixed point, Hˆ, is globally stable iff s < 1.
Furthermore, if s < 1, Hˆ is increasing with ω, β , and ρ .
When s < 1 growth finally ends andwe converge to a stationary
society inwhich the human capital Hˆ is increasing inω,β and in the
level of meritocracy. This is because when s < 1 consumption is a
poor substitute of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order
to take full advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which
eventually exhausts growth.
Proposition 4. If s > 1 the unique fixed point, Hˆ, is unstable.
Furthermore, if s > 1, Hˆ is decreasing with ω, β , and ρ . If H0 <
Hˆ, capital always decreases. Otherwise capital always increases, and
when t →∞, g t → ω − 1.
The case s > 1 in the long run is somehow similar to the
Cobb–Douglas case, in particular, in the limit, the growth rate
is independent of the returns to scale. But there are striking
similarities. Neither the taste of consumption nor the degree of
egalitarianism play any role whatsoever in the determination of
the long run growth rate, even though they play a role in the
determination of Hˆ and therefore in the fact that the economy
grows positively or negatively. The possibility of a positive
growth depends on Hˆ to be small! This explains the, apparently
paradoxical comparative statics results, that when s > 1, Hˆ is
decreasing in ω, β and ρ. This is because high initial endowments
(or taste for consumption or meritocracy) make Hˆ small and thus
it is more likely that growth is positive! Notice that in the limit
g t ≃ ω − 1 and, given that g t = lti − 1, leisure disappears in the
limit. This is due to the fact that consumption and leisure are very
substitutable, i.e. s > 1.
Finally, we note that the same assumptions that yield intuitive
comparative static results yield stability. This is a familiar situation
since Samuelson advanced the Correspondence Principle 1941,
namely thatmost assumptions that are sufficient to insure stability
of equilibrium turn out to be very useful when doing comparative
statics (and uniqueness).
4. Dynasties
The previous approach does not take into account that individ-
uals may care about future generations. Thus, when choosing labor
they disregard the effect of today’s labor on tomorrow’s capital. In
this section we consider a model in which each individual max-
imizes a utility function which is the infinite sum of discounted
utility (at rate δ) namely
Wi =
t=∞
t=1
δt−1U(cti , ω − lti ). (4.1)
Now, when an individual decides on today’s effort takes into ac-
count today’s and tomorrow’s impact of this effort.
Equilibrium arises from the maximization of (4.1) with the
following set of constraints
cti = (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t
i
H t

, t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
H ti = H t−1i lti , t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, H0i > 0.
Or equivalently,
cti = (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
0
i Π
t
T=1l
T
i
H t

, t ∈ {1, 2 . . .};H0i > 0.
Let λti be the Lagrangemultiplier associated with the constraint
at time t . First order conditions of maximization for cti and l
1
i yield
∂U(cti , ω − lti )
∂cti
δt−1 = λti , t ∈ {1, 2 . . .}
− ∂U(c
1
i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
= ρ

λ1i
(H t )γH0i
H1
+
∞
t=2
λti
(H t )γH0i Π
t
T=2l
T
i
H t

,
lim
T→∞ δ
T−1 ∂U(c
T
i , ω − lTi )
∂ lti
HTi = 0 (4.2)
where (4.2) is the transversality condition. Combining the first two
equations,
− 1
ρ
∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
= ∂U(c
1
i , ω − l1i )
∂c1i
(H1)γ−1H0i
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
∂U(cti , ω − lti )
∂cti
× (H t)γ−1H0i Π tT=2lTi . (4.3)
Given the complexity of the difference equations that characterize
the optimum, we will assume that the utility function is
Cobb–Douglas, namelyUi(cti , ω−lti ) = (cti )
β
1+β (ωti−lti )
1
1+β , β > 0.
Thus,
∂U(cti ,ω−lti )
∂cti
− ∂U(c1i ,ω−l1i )
∂ l1i
= β(c
t
i )
−1
1+β (ω − lti )
1
1+β
(c1i )
β
1+β (ω − l1i )
−β
1+β
. (4.4)
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Dividing (4.3) by−∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )/∂ l1i and using (4.4) we obtain
1
ρ
= β(ω − l
1
i )
(c1i )
(H1)γ−1H0i
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
β(cti )
−1
1+β (ω − lti )
1
1+β
(c1i )
β
1+β (ω − l1i )
−β
1+β
(H t)γ−1H0i Π
t
T=2l
T
i . (4.5)
At an interior symmetric equilibrium, lti = H t/H t−1, and cti =
(H t)γ /n. Thus, substituting in (4.5) and simplifying we get:
1
ρ
= β

ω − H
1
H0

H0
H1
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
β(H t)−
γ
1+β

ω − Ht
Ht−1
 1
1+β
(H1)
γ β
1+β

ω − H1
H0
 −β
1+β
× (H t)γ−1H0Π tT=2
HT
HT−1
. (4.6)
Inspired by the case in which δ = 0, we conjecture that
when δ > 0 and the utility function is Cobb–Douglas, human
capital would grow at a constant rate, at least if δ is small. Our
method of proof here is the familiar ‘‘propose and check’’, i.e., we
propose a certain solution and we show that this solution fulfills
the necessary and sufficient conditions of an equilibrium. For a
constant growth rate to be a solution, G = H t/H t−1 should satisfy
(4.6) for all t and the transversality condition. This implies that G
should be a solution of
G(1+ βρ)− δG γ β1+β +1 = ωβρ. (4.7)
The following proposition gives the conditions underwhich this
equation has a solution. It happens that, when (4.7) has a solution,
it has one or two of them. The constant growth rate solution to our
problem is the smallest one when there are two. Formal details of
the proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. If the utility function is Cobb–Douglas:
(i) There is constant growth rate iff
1+ βρ
γ β
1+β + 1
 1+β
γβ
+1
≥ δ 1+βγβ ωρ(1+ β)
γ
.
(ii) The growth rate is given by the smallest solution to the equation
G(1+ βρ)− δG γ β1+β +1 = ωβρ.
The necessary and sufficient condition holds for δ sufficiently
small. In particular, it always holds when δ = 0, and the growth
rate coincides with the growth rate obtained with the linear
transition function in Section 3, namelyωβρ/(1+βρ). Finally, we
show in the following proposition how the constant growth rate
varies with the parameters of the model.
Proposition 6. The growth rate is increasing inω, δ and ρ . If G > 1,
the growth rate is also increasing in γ .
Summing up, the introduction of the future in the plans of in-
dividuals has several important consequences. First, the dynam-
ics become extremely complex. Second, in the Cobb–Douglas case,
for a sufficiently small δ, there is a solution to the intertemporal
maximization problem in which the growth rate is constant. Such
a rate does not exist for certain values of the parameters, but when
it does, is larger than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting
case. This is due to the fact that when future counts, there aremore
incentives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates growth. The
role of meritocracy is identical to the case δ = 0. Meritocracy en-
courages work which produces human capital, which makes the
economy grow. For δ > 0 returns to scale does play a role. The
larger they are, the larger is the growth rate.
5. Efficiency
We turn our attention to the efficiency properties of the equi-
librium. Sen (1966) proved in a static model without capital that
equilibrium and efficiency can be reconciled by setting ρ = γ .
The intuition is that, on the one hand an egalitarian sharing rule
gives incentives to work very little. On the other hand, meritoc-
racy gives incentives to work more than it is socially efficient be-
cause an increase in work, not only means more production, it also
means that the share of the labor of the person doing this extra ef-
fort increases. Thus, by balancing egalitarianism and meritocracy,
efficiency is achieved. We now investigate if Sen’s result holds in
our model. In this section we will assume that γ ≤ 1.4
We say that an intertemporal allocation {(c˜ti , l˜ti , H˜ ti )}∞t=1 is
feasible if for all t,
n
i=1ur c˜
t
i = (H˜ t)γ , and for all i, l˜ti ∈ [0, ω]
and H˜ ti = H˜ t−1i l˜ti .
Definition 2. A feasible intertemporal allocation {(c˜ti , l˜ti , H˜ ti )}∞t=1 is
Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible intertemporal allocation
in which all individuals are better off.
It is well known that if utility functions and the production
function are concave, a Pareto Efficient allocation maximizes the
weighted sum of utilities (for someweights) under the feasible set.
With this fact in hand, we state the following result whose proof is
in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. For all δ ≥ 0, the equilibrium is Pareto efficient iff
γ = ρ .
Thus, Sen’s result is robust in the sense that it holds in a
dynamic world with capital. Unfortunately, his original result is
heavily dependent on the assumption that utility functions are
identical. Working independently, Beviá and Corchon (2009) and
Moulin (2010) proved that when individuals have different tastes,
a completely different sharing rule has to be used. Furthermore,
the production function must be polynomial.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model of accumulation of human/
social capital in a cooperative. The model has interesting features
like the existence of a constant growth rate in the case of
Cobb–Douglas preferences (dynastic or not) and the possibility of
accelerated growth when the elasticity of substitution is larger
than one and individuals do not care about future generations. We
show that by equating theweight ofmeritocracy in the sharing rule
to the elasticity of production with respect to human capital, the
intertemporal allocation of resources is efficient.
We hope that our paper, which, to the best of our knowledge
is the first to deal with growth of cooperatives, stimulates more
research in this area.
4 Since our method of proof is looking at first order conditions, we need γ ≤ 1 to
make sure that they characterize the efficient allocation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that lti ∈ [0, ω], and cti =
(H t)γ

1−ρ
n + ρ
Ht−1i lti
Ht

, Ui(cti , ω− lti ) is a continuous function of
lti , and therefore amaximumexists. In fact, thismaximum is unique
because the second order condition of utility maximization is
∂2Ui
∂(cti )2
∂cti
∂ lti
+ ∂Ui
∂cti
∂2cti
∂(lti )2
+ ∂
2Ui
∂(lti )2
(A.1)
where
cti = (H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t−1
i l
t
i
H t

. (A.2)
Given that
∂cti
∂ lti
= ρH t−1i (H t)γ−1 (A.3)
and that we assume that when individuals maximize they take
aggregate capital as given, the second term in (A.1) is zero. Given
that the utility function is CES, the first term and the third term are
negative. Thus, themaximum is unique. Finally, note that at period
1 all individuals inherit the same human capital, H0i = H0j , and
since individuals maximize taking aggregate capital as given, the
maximization at time 1 is the same for all individuals. Given that
the maximization has a unique solution, equilibrium at t = 1 is
symmetric,which implies that all individuals in period 2 inherit the
same human capital. Therefore, the equilibrium is also symmetric
in period 2 and in any other subsequent period. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us see first that l˜ti < ω. Given that
cti = (H t)γ

1−ρ
n + ρ
Ht−1i lti
Ht

, and individuals take H t as given, it
is sufficient to show that
∂Ui
∂cti
∂cti
∂ lti
+ ∂Ui
∂ lti
< 0 when lti → ω, (A.4)
that is,
β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 1
s−1

β(cti )
− 1s ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
− (ω − lti )−
1
s

< 0 when lti → ω. (A.5)
When lti → ω, both cti and ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
are strictly positive.
If s > 1, to require (A.5) is equivalent to require that
lim
lti→ω

β(cti )
− 1s ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
− (ω − lti )−
1
s

< 0. (A.6)
Since 1s > 0, (A.6) holds for i independently of what other
individuals do.
If s < 1, we can write (A.5) as A+ Bwhere
A =

β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 1
s−1

β(cti )
− 1s ∂c
t
i
∂ lti

; and (A.7)
B = −

β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 1
s−1
(ω − lti )−
1
s . (A.8)
Since both, cti and
∂cti
∂ lti
, are strictly positive when lti → ω, and
limlti→ω

β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 1
s−1 = 0, limlti→ω A = 0.
Furthermore, B can be written as
B = −

β

cti
ω − lti
 s−1
s
+ 1
 1s−1
= −
 1
β

ω−lti
cti
 1−s
s + 1

1
1−s
.
For s < 1, limlti→ω B = −1 and therefore, (A.4) holds.
Finally, when s → 1, the utility function is Cobb–Douglas, that
is
Ui(cti , ω − lti ) = (cti )
β
1+β (ωti − lti )
1
1+β , β > 0. (A.9)
Let us see that, also in this case, (A.4) holds because it canbewritten
as
β
1+ β (c
t
i )
−1
1+β (ωti − lti )
1
1+β ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
− 1
1+ β (c
t
i )
β
1+β (ωti − lti )
−β
1+β .
(A.10)
When lti → ω, the first term converges to zero and the second term
converges to−∞. Consequently, (A.4) holds.
Thus, for any s ∈ (0,∞), in equilibrium l˜ti < ω.
Secondly, let us show under which conditions lti = 0 for all i
is not an equilibrium. To show that is enough to prove that when
ltj = 0 for all j ≠ i,
∂Ui
∂cti
∂cti
∂ lti
+ ∂Ui
∂ lti
> 0 when lti → 0, (A.11)
that is,
β(cti )
s−1
s + (ω − lti )
s−1
s
 1
s−1

β(cti )
− 1s ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
− (ω − lti )−
1
s

0 when lti → 0. (A.12)
If s > 1, to require (A.12) is equivalent to require that
β(cti )
− 1s ∂c
t
i
∂ lti
> ω−
1
s when lti → 0. (A.13)
By plugging (A.2) and (A.3) stated in the proof of Proposition 1 into
(A.13), we get,
β

1− ρ
n
− 1s
ρH t−1i (H
t)
γ

s−1
s

−1
> ω−
1
s . (A.14)
Thus if γ ( s−1s ) < 1 and ρ > 0, when l
t
i → 0, H ti → 0 and (A.11)
holds.
If s < 1, we can write (A.12) as A+ B as in (A.7) and (A.8). Note
that limlti→0 B = 0, and A can be written as
A =

β +

ω − lti
cti
 s−1
s
 1s−1 
β
∂cti
∂ lti

=
 1
β +

cti
ω−lti
 1−s
s

1
1−s 
β
∂cti
∂ lti

.
The first term converges to

1
β
 1
1−s
when lti → 0 because and the
second term converges to zero if γ > 1, converges to+∞ if γ < 1,
and to ρH t−1i if γ = 1. In any case, limlti→0 A ≥ 0 and (A.11) holds.
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Finally, when s → 1, the utility function is Cobb–Douglas as in
(A.9). Let us see that, also in this case, (A.11) holds because it can be
written as in (A.10)where the second term converges to zerowhen
lti → 0, and the first term converges to zero if γ ( β1+β )−1 > 0, and
converges to+∞ if γ ( β1+β )− 1 < 0. In any case, (A.11) holds.
Summarizing, if γ ( s−1s ) < 1 and ρ > 0, the short run
equilibrium is interior. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The transition function (3.4) can be writ-
ten implicitly as
φ(H t−1,H t) = H
t
H t−1
− ω + ns−1

1
βρ
s
(H t−1)−s(H t)s(1−γ )+γ
= 0.
Clearly, at (Hˆ, Hˆ) we have that φ(Hˆ, Hˆ) = 0. Furthermore,
∂φ(Hˆ, Hˆ)/∂H t > 0 because,
∂φ(H t−1,H t)
∂H t
= 1
H t−1
+ (s(1− γ )+ γ )ns−1

1
βρ
s
× (H t−1)−s(H t)s(1−γ )+γ−1,
and s(1 − γ ) + γ > 0 given that γ ( s−1s ) < 1. Thus,
∂φ(H t−1,H t)/∂H t > 0 for any (H t−1,H t) in a rectangular domain
Ω ⊂ R2+. Therefore,
∂H t
∂H t−1
=
Ht
(Ht−1)2 + sns−1

1
βρ
s
(H t−1)−s−1(H t)s(1−γ )+γ
1
Ht−1 + (s(1− γ )+ γ )ns−1

1
βρ
s
(H t−1)−s(H t)s(1−γ )+γ−1
,
which implies that H t is an increasing function of H t−1 in any
rectangular domain.
Finally, let us see that
 ∂Ht
∂Ht−1

Hˆ
< 1 if and only if s < 1. Note
that
 ∂Ht
∂Ht−1

Hˆ
< 1 if and only if
1
Hˆ
+ sns−1

1
βρ
s
(Hˆ)γ (1−s)−1
<
1
Hˆ
+ (s(1− γ )+ γ )ns−1

1
βρ
s
(Hˆ)γ (1−s)−1,
that is, if and only if, s < 1. Furthermore, since H t is an increasing
function of H t−1, with a unique fixed point, the fixed point is also
globally stable.
That Hˆ is increasing with ω, β , and ρ when s < 1 follows
directly from (3.6). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Instability when s > 1 follows from
Proposition 3. That Hˆ is decreasing with ω, β , and ρ when s > 1
follows directly from (3.6). In order to show the last part of the
proposition, note that the transition function can be written as
H t
H t−1
+ ns−1

1
βρ
s  H t
H t−1
s
(H t)γ (1−s) = ω
which in terms of the growth rate, 1+g t = H t/H t−1, can bewritten
as follows
1+ g t + ns−1

1
βρ
s
(1+ g t)s(H t)γ (1−s) = ω. (A.15)
The left hand side of (A.15) is increasing in g t but decreasing in H t
because s > 1. Therefore, if H t > H t−1 then g t > g t−1. Thus, if
H0 > Hˆ , when t →∞, H t →∞, and
lim
t→∞(1+ g
t) ≃ ω,
which implies that g t tends to ω − 1. 
In the proof of Proposition 5 we use Berge maximum theorem
(Berge, 1963). For completeness, we recall the version of the
theorem that we are using here.
Berge maximum theorem (Berge, 1963). Let E and Y be
topological spaces. If u : E × Y → R is a continuous real-
valued function and Y is a compact set, then the correspondence
M : E → 2Y defined for each e ∈ E as
M(e) = {y ∈ Y : u(e, y) ≥ u(e, x),∀x ∈ Y }
is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) If there is a constant growth rate, 1 +
g = H t/H t−1 for all t . Let G = 1+ g . Thus, H t = H0(G)t . Note that
(G)t means G at the power of t , abusing notation and whenever no
confusion arrives, we denote G at the power of t as Gt . Using (4.6),
G should be a solution of the following equation:
1
ρ
= β(ω − G) 1
G
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
β(Gt)−
γ
1+β (ω − G)
(H0)γ (G)
γ β
1+β
(Gt)γ−1(H0)γGt−1,
or equivalently,
1
ρ
= β(ω − G) 1
G

1+ 1
δ(G)
γ β
1+β
∞
t=2

δG
γ β
1+β
t
. (A.16)
We need to make sure that the sum in the above equation is finite.
If the growth rate is constant, the transversality condition in the
optimum implies that,
lim
T→∞−δ
T−1

H0GT
γ
n
 β
1+β H0GT
n
(ω − G) −β1+β = 0,
lim
T→∞−
H
γ β
β+1+1
0
δn
β
β+1+1
(ω − G) −β1+β (δG γ ββ+1+1)T = 0.
Thus, the transversality condition implies that δG
γ β
β+1+1 < 1,which
also implies that δG
γ β
β+1 < 1 (because if δG
γ β
β+1 ≥ 1 will imply
G ≥ 1 and therefore δG γ ββ+1+1 ≥ 1). Then, (A.16) becomes
1
ρ
= β(ω − G) 1
G

1
1− δG γ β1+β

.
Arranging terms,
G(1+ βρ)− δG γ β1+β +1 = ωβρ. (A.17)
Any constant growth rate must be a solution of (A.17).
Note that when δ = 0, the growth rate coincides with
the growth rate obtained with the linear transition function in
Section 3, namely ωβρ/(1+ βρ).
For δ > 0, let us see under which conditions a solution to (A.17)
exists.
The derivative of the left hand side of (A.17) with respect to G
is 1+ βρ − ( γ β1+β + 1)δG
γ β
1+β , which has the following properties:
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(1) It is zero for a unique value of G, namely
Gˆ =
 1+ βρ
γ β
1+β + 1

δ

1+β
γβ
.
(2) For values of G less (resp. more) than this value the left hand
side of (A.17) is increasing (resp. decreasing) with respect to G.
Therefore, the left hand side of (A.17) is strictly concave with
respect to G. Note that (A.17) has a solution if and only if the left
hand side of (A.17) evaluated at Gˆ is greater or equal thanωβρ, that
is,
1+ βρ
γ β
1+β + 1
 1+β
γβ
+1
≥ δ 1+βγβ ωρ(1+ β)
γ
. (A.18)
(ii) Note that the left hand side of (A.17) is strictly concave on G
because the second derivative is negative. Thus, generically, there
are two values of G which solve this equation. We will end this
proof by showing that only the smallest root is a solution to our
problem.
Note that the one period utility function can be written as
Ui

(H t)γ

1− ρ
n
+ ρH
t
i
H t

, ω − H
t
i
H t−1i

.
Let us write the previous equation as V (H t−1i ,H
t
i ,H
t). Given that
we are assuming that the growth rate of human capital is constant,
the intertemporal utility function can be written as
Wi(δ,G) =
∞
t=1
δt−1V (H t−1i ,H
t
i ,H
t)
= F(δ,H0i ,H0i G,H0i G2, . . . ,H1,H2, . . .)
in which individuals choose (a constant) G. Applying Berge max-
imum theorem where Y = [0, ω], E = [0, 1], G ∈ [0, ω], and
δ ∈ [0, 1], we now that the correspondence
G(δ) = {G ∈ [0, ω]/Wi(δ,G) ≥ Wi(δ,G′),∀G′ ∈ [0, ω]}
has to be upper hemi-continuous.
We know that at δ = 0, the solution is such that G < Gˆ (this is
the case where Eq. (A.17) only has one solution). If for some δs the
maximum root of (A.17) were a solution, then it can be proved that
the correspondence G(δ) will fail to be upper hemi-continuous,
contradicting Berge theorem. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that, since lti < ω, G < ω. Let us
write (A.17) as H(G, ω, ρ, δ, γ ) = 0. Then,
∂G
∂ω
= −
∂H
∂ω
∂H
∂G
= βρ
∂H
∂G
;
∂G
∂δ
= −
∂H
∂δ
∂H
∂G
= G
γ β
1+β +1
∂H
∂G
;
∂G
∂ρ
= −
∂H
∂ρ
∂H
∂G
= β(ω − G)
∂H
∂G
;
∂G
∂γ
= −
∂H
∂γ
∂H
∂G
=
δ

γ β
1+β + 1

G
γ β
1+β β
1+β lnG
∂H
∂G
.
In the proof of Proposition 5 we have shown that for all G <
Gˆ, ∂H
∂G > 0. Thus, the proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7. A useful characterization of efficiency in
this case can be stated as follows: A feasible intertemporal
allocation {(c˜ti , l˜ti , H˜ ti )}∞t=1 is Pareto efficient if there exist a list
(α1, α2, . . . αn)with αi ≥ 0 for all i, such that,
{(c˜ti , l˜ti , H˜ ti )}∞t=1 ∈ argmax
n
i=1
αi
∞
t=1
δt−1U(cti , ω − lti ).
s.t.
n
i=1
cti = (H t)γ , t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
H ti = H0i Π tT=1lTi , t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, i ∈ {1, .., n}
H0i > 0, i ∈ {1, .., n}.
Now Lagrange multipliers have a time super index and the
Lagrange function is given by
n
i=1
αi
∞
t=1
δt−1U(cti , ω − lti )+
∞
t=1
λt

n
i=1
cti − (H t)γ

+
n
i=1
∞
t=1
µti (H
t
i − H0i Π tT=1lTi ).
FOC are
αiδ
t−1 ∂U(c
t
i , ω − lti )
∂cti
+ λt = 0; (A.19)
αi
∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
− µ1i H0i −
∞
t=1
µtiH
0
i Π
t
T=2l
T
i = 0; (A.20)
−λtγ (H t)γ−1 + µti = 0. (A.21)
From (A.21) µti = λtγ (H t)γ−1, and from (A.19), µti =
−αiδt−1 ∂U(c
t
i ,ω−lti )
∂cti
γ (H t)γ−1. Thus, (A.21) can be written as:
αi
∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
+ αi ∂U(c
1
i , ω − l1i )
∂c1i
γ (H1)γ−1H0i
+
∞
t=2
αiδ
t−1 ∂U(c
t
i , ω − lti )
∂cti
γ (H t)γ−1H0i Π
t
T=2l
T
i = 0,
or equivalently,
− 1
γ
∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
= ∂U(c
1
i , ω − l1i )
∂c1i
(H1)γ−1H0i
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
∂U(cti , ω − lti )
∂cti
× (H t)γ−1H0i Π tT=2lTi . (A.22)
Comparing (A.22) with (4.3), namely
− 1
ρ
∂U(c1i , ω − l1i )
∂ l1i
= ∂U(c
1
i , ω − l1i )
∂c1i
(H1)γ−1H0i
+
∞
t=2
δt−1
∂U(cti , ω − lti )
∂cti
× (H t)γ−1H0i Π tT=2lTi ,
we see that they are identical when γ = ρ and it is independent
on δ. 
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